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THE MONIST 
WILL-FORCE AND THE CONSERVATION OF 
ENERGY. 
THE following essay contains an argument which, I believe, has never yet been stated by any one else— 
much less refuted. Once I did publish it in the January 
number of The Monist for 1899; but I was completely mis-
understood by the Editor, Dr. Paul Carus. My reply to 
him came late; and was not published. In offering this 
argument now for publication, I throw down the gauntlet 
to the whole philosophic world, especially to Prof. Ernst 
Haeckel of Jena, whose recent famous publication briefly 
sums up the pronouncements of nineteenth century science 
on the opposite side. 
* * * 
To me it has always seemed that there is absolutely no 
escape from the conclusion that consciousness—or the con-
scious principle in man and animals—actually does, ever 
and again, originate energy. 
There are two main steps in the argument by which this 
theory is established. 
1. Mind directs the motions of matter. This theory 
has been disputed by some leading intellects, more scien-
tists than philosophers, notably Professor Huxley, who 
boldly maintained that the mind was a mere spectator of 
all that occurred around it, and was powerless to interfere. 
To others, such as Tyndall, the problem has remained a 
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standing puzzle. But I think most are now gradually com-
ing round to the view that mind does direct the motions 
of matter. And perhaps what has chiefly led to this is, 
that without this theory there seems to be no foundation 
for the ethical idea—ethics ceases to be a science. If all 
movements are determined by purely mechanical or phys-
ical causes there is no room for any question of right or 
wrong. If all the internal and external movements of 
animal bodies were entirely independent of consciousness, 
and would go on just the same if consciousness were not 
involved, then there is an end of all moral responsibility. 
Of course this is only an indirect argument. And I think 
there is no direct proof of the theory. We can only argue, 
"for if not, if it be possible, suppose that consciousness 
does not direct motion," and then see if the alternative 
conclusions thus presented are such as we can swallow. 
The disappearance of the distinction between right and 
wrong is one of the first conclusions. Possibly two or three 
logical fanatics might be found who would not stick even 
at this. But I think it safe to say that there is not the 
smallest possibility of any such theory ever becoming more 
than a curiosity. 
Another indirect argument is simply this—can we pos-
sibly believe that all that has ever happened and is happen-
ing among conscious beings in this world, would have 
happened and would go on happening exactly the same, if 
consciousness was not and never had been present. If ani-
mals were unconscious creatures would the daily and 
yearly events of their lives be exactly the same? You 
can't prove that they would not be by Barbara or by any-
thing else. But the fact remains that the alternative con-
clusion is absurd—what then would be the function of 
consciousness, what the use of it ? None! Well you would 
never get anybody but a few logical monomaniacs to be-
lieve that. 








The direct argument is not conclusive. And yet per-
haps it is as conclusive as the indirect one. The direct 
argument is simply—All conscious beings are conscious 
of controlling events; if this consciousness has no founda-
tion in fact, how do you explain it? And the answer is 
that it is quite capable of explanation. So long as that 
which happens is that which we desire, we infer that it is 
our desire that has brought it about; when it is not what 
we want, we attribute it to external causes. 
But I think there is an answer to that. Reckoning 
numerically, the vast majority of all the movements of the 
body which are accompanied by consciousness are just 
what we desire—unless a man be diseased by paralysis or 
drunkenness, or catalepsy, or something of that sort, his 
arms and legs never fail to do the hundreds of little things 
that he is continually wanting them to do, all day long. 
But, it will be said, our actions are the result of in-
grained habit—the result of certain tendencies inherent in 
the physical constitution of the body. And our sense of 
desiring them is really merely the sense of pleasure that 
comes from doing what our bodies are especially made to 
do—the sense of pleasure that always more or less forms 
part of the performance of any natural and healthy func-
tion, or even sometimes of morbid activities that have be-
come habitual. 
But that argument can easily be met. Let us rigidly 
exclude any and all activities that are habitual. Let us 
select any actions quite arbitrarily—actions, not activities. 
Think for a moment—"I will move my arm or leg, this 
way or that," and you find you can do it. Can we possibly 
attribute each one of these instances to a mere coincidence 
that the motion of the arm or the leg happened to occur 
just at the same time as the desire for that mot ion?. . . . 
Really I think this is the strongest argument of all. It is 
not the direct argument with which we started. The direct 
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argument, "I desire this movement—this movement oc-
curs—therefore my desire is the cause of it"—may be said 
to have failed. Because, theoretically, there is an alter-
native conclusion. But that alternative conclusion pres-
ents, surely, the biggest indirect argument—the strongest 
reductio ad absurdum—that it would be possible to find 
anywhere. If there is a stage at which the probabilities 
of the indirect form of argument become as good as the 
certainties of a direct one, it is surely here. 
The reply, if any, could only be, that it is only through 
illusion that the movement appears to follow the desire; 
and that, as a matter of fact, it is the desire that follows 
the movement—the desire being, really, a mere conscious-
ness of and pleased acquiescence in the movement. But 
then, I say, try the experiment as often as you like; deter-
mine on the movement a measurable time beforehand, so 
as to be sure that it is the movement that follows the de-
sire, and not vice versa. To which you might perhaps 
reply, "Again illusion. The desire which appeared to you 
to determine the movement, was really itself determined 
by the same unseen, internal, previous causes, which de-
termined the movement."—Well it is a conclusive answer 
to that argument, if, instead of trying to pre-determine the 
movement yourself, you let somebody else determine it for 
you. That effectually eliminates all possibility of illusion. 
Physiological causes internal in you could not have deter-
mined in the other person's mind the choice of what move-
ment you should make. 
But besides all that—even when you pre-determine 
the movement yourself, why suppose illusion? The evi-
dence of our senses is all that we ever have about anything 
at all. And generally speaking we think it right to accept 
it. You must then have some especial reason in this case 
for imagining that there is illusion at work. 








And that is the point. You have a special reason, all 
you scientists, for rejecting the evidence of your senses in 
this case. And that reason is the conservation of energy. 
That mind can direct the motions of matter appears to you 
to be the contrary to the theory of the conservation of en-
ergy; hence your obstinate objection to the theory of the 
conscious control of motion. 
Now this theory of the conservation of energy is an in-
vention of the day before yesterday. And yet all you scien-
tists will accept any alternative however extraordinary, 
rather than give it up. You will deny the existence of moral 
responsibility, and you will believe that all conscious beings 
are mere machines, and that consciousness is without any 
function or use in life, which could get on just as well 
without it, and you will reject the daily experiences of all 
mankind from the earliest times up to now, and will tax 
your brains to invent all kinds of extraordinary hypotheses 
to provide a way out of the difficulties that you yourselves 
have created out of your adherence to this pet new theory, 
rather than allow this one exception to it. Such is the 
pride of intellect! 
If anything had to go to the wall, it would be this new-
fangled theory of the conservation of energy. But I will 
show later on that you may still keep your theory if you 
like, though in a somewhat modified form, and may admit 
the plain evidence of your senses as well. 
I think, however, as I said, that the opinion that mind 
directs the movements of matter, is steadily gaining ad-
herence among men of science to-day. They do not give 
up the conservation of energy; but they try all sorts of 
intellectual gymnastics to try and reconcile the two the-
ories.* I hope to make the feat an easier one for them. 
Meanwhile, after what I have said, I think we are justified 
* See Prof. Lloyd Morgan in the October number of The Monist for 1896, 
in an article on "Animal Automatism and Consciousness," about which the 
less said the better. 
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in taking the former theory as practically proved. Mind 
directs the movements of matter. 
Now for the next step. How does it do so? Here I 
issue my challenge: 
2. There is one very evident, and very simple way, in 
which, we can easily see, that mind might direct the move-
ments of matter. 
Suppose a certain single, simple movement of a certain 
material body has been completely pre-determined by cer-
tain mechanical causes—that is, by certain previous move-
ments of that and other material bodies; and suppose that 
after this material body has started on its mechanically 
predetermined career, some conscious being observing the 
event suddenly perceives that, from a human point of view, 
it is a matter of tremendous importance that the motion 
of that particular material body should receive a certain 
particular change in direction. What then is the role of 
consciousness ? How can it interfere to avert the mechan-
ically predetermined result, or, to bring about a result 
predetermined in consciousness. Some, second, additional, 
different motion must be added to the motion of the mate-
rial body such that the resultant of the two will cause the 
body to move in the required direction. And—this is the 
point—in order to effect the desired object, this second 
motion must be completely predetermined by consciousness 
and cannot be the mere mechanical resultant of previous 
material motions. If it had a purely mechanical origin it 
might go in the wrong direction, and the catastrophe 
would not be averted, or, the desired result would be 
missed. The second motion, which is designed to impart 
to the body a certain direction pre-chosen by consciousness, 
must be entirely determined in direction by that conscious-
ness, and must therefore be an initial motion dating solely 
from that consciousness—originating solely in it,—and 
having no previous mechanical history. If its direction 








is pre-determined by consciousness, then it is not pre-
determined by mechanics, and it bears no relation what-
ever to any previous mechanical movements. If its di-
rection is pre-determined by previous motions of matter, 
then it bears no relation to consciousness. 
In this way consciousness could direct the movements 
of matter. And there is no conceivable other way. 
This conclusion—the primary causation of material 
motion, that is of energy, by mind—is one against which 
leading scientists of strong anti-spiritualist prejudices have 
fought and struggled heroically. But it is a conclusion 
which is forced home—a conclusion from which there is 
no escape. Nowadays they are some of them beginning 
to admit that consciousness directs motion; but they try 
all sorts of maneuvers to show that this is possible without 
the origination of motion from any source outside the closed 
circle of mechanical cause and effect. But these efforts 
are futile. There is no standing ground between the two 
positions. If consciousness directs a motion, it does so by 
originating another motion. There is no other way. If 
consciousness cannot originate motion, then it does not 
direct motion. The scientist is thrown on to the horns of 
a dilemma. He must allow that consciousness can origi-
nate motion; or he must be satisfied with a purely mechan-
ical explanation of the entire behavior of all conscious 
beings. There is no wriggling out of the position. And 
those scientists who have gone as far as to allow that 
consciousness does direct events, must go the rest of the 
way, and allow that consciousness originates motion; or, 
they must go back. 
In using here the terms "mechanical energy" and 
"mechanical cause and effect," I do not of course mean to 
say that the energies of the human body which are directed 
by the conscious principle are simply mechanical like the 
energy of a billiard ball due to its motion across a table. 
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I merely mean to say that the problem of directing energy 
of any form whatever is essentially the same as the prob-
lem of imparting a given change of direction to the simple 
mechanical movement of any mass. Of course the simple 
mechanical motions of masses have in all cases their im-
mediate cause in some form of physical energy, such as 
heat, light, electricity, gravity, or muscular, or nervous 
energy. But in every attempt to effect a given change of 
direction in the simple mechanical motion of a body without 
originating an independent motion, there is the same in-
herent absurdity, whether it is sought to make this change 
by direct action on the body whose mechanical motion is 
to be changed, or by introducing some change in the pre-
vious physical causes of that motion. By attempting its 
task further back among the previous physical causes 
which lead up to the motion which it is desired to change, 
the conscious principle may obtain a certain mechanical 
advantage. But the difficulty is one which it is essentially 
impossible to avoid entirely. It is inherent, and not to be 
avoided by any maneuvering. 
There, in brief, is my challenge to the philosophical 
world. What I have to say now is merely in further ex-
planation and illustration of my theory, and to round it 
off, and attempt to show its place in cosmical philosophy. 
* * * 
I said I would try and help the scientist to reconcile the 
origination of motion by mind with the theory of the con-
servation of energy. Well, this is my attempt. 
There is something that offends the reason in the idea 
of force having any beginning at all—or in anything hav-
ing a beginning. Creation out of nothing is an absurdity. 
In this case, however, force does not appear suddenly out 
of nothing, but out of consciousness. The truth must be 
then that force exists in the universe in two forms, viz.. 








in association with consciousness and in association with 
matter. In the former form we have no measure of it at 
all, as it does not appear at all to our physical senses. But 
the reasonable inference that it exists, is, nevertheless, valid. 
When changing from the one form to the other, it would 
be manifest to our senses, but that it is so small in amount 
that no physical sense is delicate enough to perceive it. 
Here again our knowledge of its existence rests upon pure 
reason, but is not the less positive. This earth's store of 
energy measurable in foot-pounds is thus ever receiving 
additions. They may be so small as to make practically 
very little difference; but they are nevertheless real and 
definite. 
The theory of the conservation of energy is therefore 
not wrong, but it requires re-modeling. The total amount 
of energy in the universe is constant, but it is also infinite. 
It exists in two forms, ( i ) spiritual, and (2) material, or 
mechanical; that is, measurable in terms of matter and 
motion. Reason shows that spiritual force is constantly 
passing into material force. But if the total quantity of 
each throughout the universe is infinite, then this incessant 
transformation will make no difference to either. 
The total supply of spiritual force in the universe must 
be infinite; otherwise it would be liable to exhaustion. 
The total amount of material energy, too, is also probably 
infinite. For it seems unreasonable to suppose that the 
process of transformation ever had a beginning in time. 
With regard to the conservation of material energy 
considered by itself, the old theory is right in the main, but 
it states a little more than there is warrant for. When 
altered as far as is necessary to reconcile it with psychical 
causation, it is reduced to this—not that material energy 
has no beginning and no end, but merely that it has no end. 
Once started it can never be lost. It is indestructible; but, 
though indestructible it may change form, whilst still re-
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maining material energy. It may change from kinetic— 
energy that causes motion in matter, to potential—energy 
in equilibrium and resulting in stillness. And, what is 
more, when left alone it seems to have a natural tendency 
in this direction. And nothing but the interference of will-
force can entirely defeat this tendency. The amount of 
will-force in the universe necessary to continue forever 
upsetting this tendency to equilibrium must be infinite. 
The conception of the conservation of energy which rep-
resents it as a perpetual motion machine is wrong. There 
is no such thing as a system in perpetual motion without 
perpetual interference from without. Motion in any sys-
tem however large tends eventually to equilibrium. Even 
in an infinite system this would be so, if the system were 
purely mechanical; for there might, quite possibly, exist 
an infinite mass of matter in a state of equilibrium. And 
without interference from a realm outside of mechanics 
it is to that end that the mechanical motions of an infinite 
system would ever tend.* 
* * * 
Another circumstance which, with very many persons, 
tends to obscure the fundamental principle of voluntary 
action is that indirectness in the methods of consciousness, 
to which we have already referred. Consciousness always 
operates in the body, through a long chain of events. If 
it is simply a case of a limb to be moved, the initial motion 
is not imparted to the limb, nor yet to the muscles that 
work it. The energy stored up in the muscles of a man's 
arms and legs comes from the food that he eats. It is set 
free by something of the nature of an electric current, 
proceeding along his nerves to his muscles. The electric 
current is started by some molecular movement in his 
brain. And the molecular movement may be started by 
* The main idea of this paragraph is taken from Professor Ward's Gifford 
Lectures and from an article by Heysinger in The Monist for July, 1904. 
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an atomic movement. But all that does not invalidate the 
proof of the existence of an independent will-force. Right 
back of the whole physical process—somewhere in the 
brain of the man—there must be an initial motion which is 
wholly predetermined in direction and velocity by the con-
scious principle. Otherwise there would be absolutely no 
guarantee that the ultimate movements would be in the 
direction forechosen by consciousness. It may be the mo-
tion of a certain molecule of the brain—or, of some sub-
molecule—or, simpler even than that, of some atom—or, 
of a particle of the ether,—or, an electron, whatever that 
may be. But the initial motion must be. 
Let it be clearly understood that I do not say that 
motions that are directed by consciousness must be origi-
nated by consciousness. But I do say, that in order to 
direct one motion, consciousness must originate another. 
It is sufficient to originate a motion very much smaller 
than the one to be directed. Consciousness acts as a spark 
to a train of gunpowder. In the gunpowder you have 
certain enormous forces in equilibrium, and therefore re-
sulting in stillness. The spark contains a tiny amount of 
energy, just sufficient to upset the equilibrium when prop-
erly directed. And thus the enormous forces are let loose. 
The energy that releases the locked forces, may be ever 
so small, but it cannot be nil; it must be something definite 
in amount. To take another illustration: Imagine a mass 
of boulders, piled mountains high, reaching up out of the 
sea, and all just exactly in equilibrium. The slightest 
movement communicated by the surrounding air, the beat 
of a bird's wing flying over, or the mere sound of a voice— 
would be sufficient to upset the whole mountain, and send 
its boulders all thundering into the sea causing great 
waves sufficient to wreck ships. As a matter of fact, it is 
believed by mountain dwellers all over the world, that the 
sound of a voice is sufficient to start an avalanche on the 
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side of a snow-covered mountain. But in each case, the 
releasing energy, however small, is yet, of some definite 
magnitude. 
I think perhaps the best analogy is found in the steam 
steering gear of an ocean liner, or a man-o'-war.* The 
touch of a babe's little finger might decide whether all the 
thousands of tons of matter and tons of explosives, and 
hundreds of human liyes, are to go smoothly on their way, 
or hurtling to destruction. Suppose the engines to be of 
some ideally perfect pattern, such that they do everything 
for themselves, and every mechanism throughout the ship 
so perfect that the whole crew can be dispensed with— 
except the man at the wheel, and imagine him to be in-
visible^—and you have something somewhat analogous to 
the mechanics of human action. Examine such a ship. 
Begin with the big limbs that do the main work of the 
body—the screw-propeller, and the machinery that drives 
it, and the power that moves the machinery. Throughout 
all, the mechanical connections, mechanical cause and effect 
—using the term mechanical in a wide sense to denote all 
material motion—are perfect. The power is traced to the 
coal that the engine eats and the water that it drinks—the 
pressure on the piston is experimentally proved, and the 
source of it ascertained—and the connection from piston 
to screw-propeller perfectly mapped out. But then we 
come to the steering gear. And here everything points to 
the control of big forces by smaller ones properly directed. 
The big rudder is seen to move and turn the ship. The 
rudder is seen to be controlled by machinery that is worked 
by an engine whose source of power is the same as that of 
the engine that works the propeller; but it is a much 
smaller engine. Then it, in its turn, is found to be con-
trolled by other machinery, which leads us up at last to the 
* I am indebted for the idea of this analogy to an article which appeared 
in Indian Engineering some time ago. 








steering wheel, and that appears to move by some other 
source of power which we cannot find. And then it is seen 
how the faintest movement of that wheel changes the 
course of the whole ship one way or the other. We repeat 
this process experimentally ourselves—touch the wheel 
lightly with a finger and watch the great ship move in 
response—just as we might touch the cortex of the brain 
with an electric current, and watch a responsive movement 
in the body. But the source of the minute energy that 
moves the wheel eludes perception. 
Then let the man at the wheel be visible; and let us 
examine him;—and in the end we are no nearer the thing 
sought for. Smaller in amount than even the energy in 
the finger that touches the wheel, is the energy originated 
by consciousness in the brain that directs the nerve that 
moves the muscle of the finger. And thus is man, the 
weakest of all animals, gaining the conquest of the world. 
There is something magnificent in this spectacle of the 
power of the mind—the effects of the energy originated 
by consciousness—so tiny in amount, and so tremendous 
and far-reaching in result. We cannot see it, but we know 
by reason that it must be there,—the little deus ex machina. 
What an economy there is here. It is simply its smallness 
that has made scientists so persistently refuse to believe 
in it. The whole process appears to be mechanical. The 
infinitesimal stranger* that just makes all the difference, 
and without which the whole process would be impossible 
—escapes the ken of science. It reminds one somewhat of 
the action of a speck of impurity in zinc immersed in acid. 
The speck remains unchanged itself, but it is sufficient to 
start an electric current, which could not be produced if 
the zinc were perfectly pure. The speck disturbs the equi-
librium. 
•This expression and the analogy that follows are borrowed from another 
article in Indian Engineering, by a Mr. Ewbank. 
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The foregoing description of the methods of conscious-
ness provides one example of the part played by uncon-
scious material energy in the animal body. Under the 
direction of the mind, the material energy of the muscles 
does all the hard work; it is the cooli of the mental powers. 
But there are muscular and other material energies in 
the body which appear to have little or no connection with 
the mind at all—which appear to work away and produce 
important results without any mental control. I have al-
ready briefly alluded to some of these processes in the 
first part of my argument, under the general term "habit." 
To run to the assistance of a little child in great imminent 
danger, to lift the arm and duck the head to protect the lat-
ter from an imminent blow, to smoke a pipe, or to drink 
whiskey,—all of these are, or may become, habitual or in-
stinctive actions. And there is a little more to be said on this 
subject of habit, to completely fit it in with the theory of 
will-force. 
The attempt is constantly being made by more or less 
philosophic scientists with more or less of a bias towards 
the mechanical theory, to explain all animal action as 
habitual, and therefore mechanical,—instance Professor 
Huxley's famous experiment with the frog. I have shown 
that there are obstinate facts which entirely upset the 
mechanical theory as a complete explanation of animal 
actions. Yet I have not denied the existence of many 
actions which are entirely habitual, and which, as such, 
are very largely, if not entirely explicable from purely 
mechanical data. I merely said that notwithstanding the 
existence of these habitual actions in the body, there are 
undoubtedly a great number of other actions which can-
not be explained in this way. But the fact of habitual ac-
tion still remains, and the relation of such actions to the 
will-force has yet to be described—they must be given 
their position in the theory. It is not sufficient merely to 








ignore them. If such a large part of our daily work can 
be done by habit, then why not all? Or, if consciousness 
has a part to play in some actions, then why not in all? 
Why should both methods be required in the animal body, 
the habitual and the voluntary? Then besides habitual 
actions there are reflex activities. These certainly appear 
to be entirely mechanical. In habitual actions conscious-
ness is not wholly absent. It appears to look on without 
interfering, but keeping ready to interfere at any time if 
necessary. In reflex action consciousness is wholly absent. 
Yet it is interesting to observe that consciousness can 
interfere if it chooses in some of the most important reflex 
actions of the body and in some persons more than in 
others. 
The theory that connects consciousness with habit and 
reflex action is really pretty well known. But its im-
portance is not apparent until the role played by conscious-
ness comes to be recognized. A brief recapitulation of 
what is well known, is all that I need give here. 
It is a matter of common observation that habitual 
actions grow out of actions performed by conscious effort. 
In learning to play a difficult musical instrument, such as 
the piano or violin, the closest and most persistent mental 
application and intent concentration of purpose are neces-
sary to the beginner. But as the particular portion of the 
brain concerned, and the nerves and muscles all get edu-
cated up to their work, the process becomes easier and 
easier—the amount of conscious application becomes less 
and less—the physiological activities become more and 
more mechanical, and consciousness comes more and more 
to the position of a critical spectator looking on and ready 
to interfere at a moment's notice if anything goes wrong 
in the machinery. At last, in well-learned compositions, 
the performer will be able to talk of other subjects, and 
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play at the same time—but should he make a mistake, he 
will notice it at once and correct it. 
Instinct is but habit intensified by ages of heredity. 
Yet, in the instincts of animals we see evidence that the 
connection with consciousness is still kept up, in the way 
individual animals sometimes introduce slight variations 
into their instinctive actions of their own will—generally 
to adapt themselves to some peculiarity in their surround-
ings—sometimes apparently out of pure whim. 
Reasoning by analogy it is not inconceivable that re-
flex action may have grown out of habitual action by be-
coming fixed and intensified through a long process of 
mechanical repetition, both in the individual, and—through 
heredity—in the species, without any occasion for inter-
ference from consciousness. Yet at this day we do find 
that the action of the bowels, and the lungs, and—in some 
people—the heart also can be controlled by the will. 
In the formation of habits we see the conscious prin-
ciple at work building up its own body—constructing its 
own machinery for the carrying out of its own desires 
and plans. And it proceeds on exactly the same lines 
as the mechanical inventor, whose aim is ever to get 
more and more work done mechanically, so as to save 
labor—so as to save the trouble of conscious interference, 
and thus to set the conscious agent free, for general direc-
tion and supervision, and for other work. 
* * * 
It will be fitting here to conclude with a brief statement 
of two main results of the theory of will-force. 
I. If force originates in consciousness, then, is not 
consciousness, as an origin, itself elementary? The argu-
ment that force is inherent in matter does not hold good 
here. We are confronted with an exception from which 
there is no escape. All force that is bound up in matter 








is found to act in an invariable manner according to certain 
fixed laws, which are such that given certain preliminary 
measurements of the forces and masses concerned, the 
direction and strength of the succeeding movements in the 
system can be precisely foretold. But in the case of con-
sciously directed motion, we have a force whose direction 
depends solely upon consciousness and is essentially abso-
lutely independent of the direction and strength of any 
previously operating forces. It is the inherent nature of 
this force that in direction it is quite independent of any 
previous material or dynamic factors. It originates solely 
in consciousness. It is originally something quite apart 
from matter. It afterwards enters into matter; and, once 
there, there it stays for ever—merely moving from matter 
to matter. But it it did not begin in matter. It began in 
consciousness solely. What is this but to say that con-
sciousness is a distinct element in the cosmos equally with 
matter ? 
There is some difficulty in conceiving of the origin 
of force in consciousness, just as there is difficulty in con-
ceiving of its origin in matter; because, just as matter and 
force are abstractions of different orders, so are conscious-
ness and force. Consciousness essentially—ontologically 
—is simply awareness. Force is quite a different concept. 
But, if the validity of the foregoing arguments is accepted, 
then this difficulty must be accepted likewise. The state-
ment of the case on the lines of the spiritualist hypothesis 
is this: Spirit is a trinity of three attributes, (1) knowl-
edge, or consciousness, or awareness, (2) will, (3) emo-
tion. In terms of this conception, then, we should say, 
not that consciousness originates motion in matter, but 
that spirit originates motion in matter. As force exists in 
matter and yet is not matter; so it exists in spirit and yet 
is not spirit. These different ontological entities that make 
up the universe, are bound together in a certain order. 
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They have certain fixed relations one to another. That 
is all we are able at present to say. Time, space, matter, 
spirit, force, and in spirit we have three bound together 
in certain fixed relations of their own, viz., knowledge, 
will, and emotion. In this system of philosophy, it would 
be as well to restrict the term energy to that form of force 
which it assumes when united with matter. 
We have no means at present of reducing the number 
of these elements. And we must not allow too strong an 
a priori bias in favor of simplification, and an absolutely 
unitary conception of the universe, to betray us into en-
forcing simplification, where the facts of experience and 
the legitimate inferences of pure reason are against it. 
After all, where there is order, there there is monism, 
there there is harmony. The very existence of order im-
plies the existence of differing elements; and the eager 
attempt to reduce everything to one is an extreme tend-
ency of certain minds unwarranted by facts. It is the 
false philosophy stigmatized by the editor of The Monist, 
under the name—Henism.* 
The theory of will-force makes a difference to the 
whole process of evolution. 
Evolution is now no longer a purely physical process, 
an affair of matter and energy. In the animal kingdom, 
in every organism undergoing evolution, the conscious 
entity is at work. The change in the structure of the or-
ganism is not due solely to the action of its environment. 
It is assisted, sometimes at any rate, by the effort of the 
conscious entity in the organism, to operate on its own 
environment, or on its own body, for its own purposes. 
The swiftest deer escape the tiger, and give birth to other 
deer that inherit their swiftness, while the slower ones are 
devoured. And so the deer tribe become swift of foot. 
* I am aware that Dr. Paul Carus would be equally opposed to my notion 
of an Ordered Pluralism. 








But it is evident how greatly this result must be helped on 
by the conscious effort of the deer to run as fast as he can. 
He uses his muscles to the very best advantage, and by 
use develops them. Thus the conscious entity in the deer, 
to some extent, builds its own body. And this reminds 
one, by the way, of the great stress that Professor Sandow 
lays on the putting of the will into the working of the par-
ticular muscle to be developed — the concentration of 
thought on that muscle. The deer cannot do this, because 
he has no knowledge of anatomy. But he works on the 
same principle as far as he is able.* 
It seems likely that evolution proceeding on these lines 
will not require the enormous periods of time otherwise 
necessary to produce its results. A second, and totally 
distinct force, has been introduced as a factor in the 
process. 
Evolution under guidance, is the theory invented as a 
compromise between religion and science. We see now 
how the guidance is introduced. It is introduced in the 
conscious efforts of the organisms undergoing evolution. 
The spiritual force in each, it is only reasonable to suppose, 
is derived from an infinite source pervading the whole uni-
verse. But it is in the conscious effort of the individual 
organism that we discover its working. 
From this we may, cautiously, advance another step. 
If individual will-force is derived from an infinite universal 
source, then, reasoning by analogy, it is natural to infer 
that the universal will-force is employed in the grand 
affairs of the universe in the same manner as individual 
will-force is employed in the smaller affairs of animals and 
men—that universal evolution also is under guidance. 
Thus, from the individual will, we advance to the idea of 
God. This is not strict argument. But it is a reasonable 
•This psychical process of body-building appears in its physical aspect 
as development by use. 
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hypothesis which serves the purpose of providing a place 
in universal philosophy for the proved truth of individual 
will-force. 
There is, perhaps, a rather stricter argument which 
leads to the same conclusion. If some material energy 
originates in will-force, then it is a legitimate inference 
that all material energy has this origin. It would be a 
superfluous unnecessary assumption to suppose that we 
had two distinct kinds of material energy in the world, 
one derived from will-force, and one without any origin 
outside of itself. Once will-force is transformed into ma-
terial energy, there is essentially nothing to differentiate 
it from other material energy—it has become the same 
thing. So it is obvious that we have but one kind of mate-
rial energy in the universe. Then, as we find that there 
are provable instances of the origination of that material 
energy in will-force, and as this material energy is all of 
one kind, therefore it is an inevitable inference that all 
material energy has this origin. Therefore the whole uni-
verse must be pervaded by will-force. This universal will-
force is one aspect of God, Brahma, the Universal Spirit. 
This is not to say that the process of transformation 
from will-force to energy ever had a beginning in time 
To argue , that as all material energy has had an origin in 
will-force, therefore there must have been a time when 
there was no material energy—when all energy was spir-
itual—would be unwarranted. Because, the amount of 
material energy in the universe may be infinite. It seems 
natural to suppose that it is. And if so, then the process 
has been going on forever. 
W. E. AYTON WILKINSON. 
BURMA, INDIA. 
 by guest on June 9, 2016
http://m
onist.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
